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Divided but United: European Trade Policy Integration and EC-US Agricultural 
Negotiations in the Uruguay Round 
The European Community (EC)} has long displayed a powerful external 
personality in international trade negotiations, unlike its lack of an effective presence in 
the diplomacy and security realms. By joining the Community, the member states 
formally relinquish their power to negotiate as autonomous actors in international trading 
talks. Instead, they first have to agree on a common bargaining position, which 
Commission negotiators then carry out at the international level. In theory, Europe's 
international negotiating position could be expected to be as much weakened by the 
addition of a supplementary level of bargaining and the ensuing internal battles, as it is 
strengthened by the combination of forces of all member states. How has the integration 
of trade policy in Europe actually affected the external bargaining capabilities of the EC? 
The behavior of the EC in international trade negotiations is characterized by a 
constant tension between the need to take into account the internal divergences among 
member states and the obligation to present a common front internationally --the EC is 
divided but united. How does the combined negotiating effort by the EC affect the final 
compromise reached at the international level? This chapter analyzes the bargaining 
constraints and opportunities for the EC created by the obligation to negotiate as a single 
entity and assesses which country has the most to gain or lose by negotiating as part of an 
indivisible whole when its interests diverge from those of its partners. It argues that the 
internal decision-making structure of the EC affects the process and outcome of its 
negotiations with third countries. The voting rules at the EC level and the amount of 
autonomy exercised by EC negotiators are central to determining whether the final 
international agreement reflects the position of the median or of the most extreme 
member state. Moreover, this chapter argues that the institutional structure of the EC 
determines its effectiveness as an international actor. The commonly held belief that unity 
brings strength suggests that the EC's institutional structure undermines its external 
negotiating position because it allows the expression of divergent interests. This chapter 
finds instead that, under certain conditions, internal divisions over the negotiating 
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mandate and the ratification requirements of the agreement can play to the advantage of 
the EC in international negotiations. 
The EC-US negotiations on agricultural trade liberalization in the Uruguay Round 
of GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) provide a good illustration of the 
impact of the EC institutional structure on its external bargaining capabilities, because the 
EC's international negotiating efforts took place through a series of formal and informal 
institutional changes in the Community. In this case, an agreement was negotiated in 
good faith between representatives of the US and the Commission acting as the EC's sole 
voice. The agreement was then reopened by the outlying member state because the 
European negotiating authority was contested. This debate triggered a crisis in the EC 
about the legitimacy of the Commission's representation and a questioning of Europe's 
trade policy practices. The final EC-US agricultural accord in the Uruguay Round was 
partly shaped by the most recalcitrant country reclaiming the veto right and tightening the 
member states' control over the Commission in the later stage of the negotiations. 
The first section of this chapter analyses the rationale behind trade policy 
integration in the EC and retraces the evolution of the sharing of competences on trade 
issues between the member states and the Commission. Section two explores the impact 
of the EC institutional structure on its external bargaining capabilities and analyses how 
the Community being "divided but united" affects the outcomes of international trade 
negotiations. The third section explains the conclusion of the "Blair House agreement" in 
1992 after years of unsuccessful negotiations by focusing on the bargaining autonomy 
seized by Commission negotiators, while the subsequent reinstating of veto power and 
limitation of the Commission's autonomy are used to explain the eventual renegotiation 
of the agreement. The Conclusion examines the institutional changes in EC trade policy 
making brought about by the experience of the Uruguay Round negotiations and suggests 
how these changes might affect EC bargaining capabilities in the future. 
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Section 1: Negotiating as One on Trade Issues 
External trade has been the longest integrated policy in the EC, and the 
competence to hold international trade negotiations has been granted to the Commission 
since the 1960s. Yet member states still contest this devolution of negotiating power to 
the supranational authority when it does not serve their immediate national interests, 
resulting in internal crises in the EC and in confusion for the negotiating partners. 
The EC as an International Trading Actor 
The early integration of its trade policy enabled the EC to become not only a trade 
giant but also an effective actor in international trade negotiations. At its inception the EC 
was conceived primarily as a common trading area with external borders. The Common 
Market founders devised a common external tariff and a set of common rules to protect 
these external borders. Trade policy has always been the exclusive competence of the 
Community. It is carried out by the Directorate General for External Relations (DG I) of 
the Commission. Member states successively added new trade policy instruments to 
defend the Community against unfair trade practices and unilateral measures from other 
trading partners, mostly the US and Japan. The latest reform of EC trade policy, 
following the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1994, established that decisions on the 
use of trade policy instruments, such as anti-dumping rules, are now taken by the 
Commission unless a qualified majority of member states opposes it. 
Reaching a Common EC Bargaining Position 
The member states of the EC also integrated their trade negotiating authority from 
the beginning. Under Article 111, the Council of Ministers was to take bargaining 
positions under unanimity until January 1966, the end of the transitional period. Qualified 
majority voting would have been automatically instituted after this date, had France's De 
Gaulle not paralyzed the functioning of Community institutions with the "empty chair" 
crisis during the Kennedy Round. The crisis resulted in the "Luxembourg Compromise," 
a gentleman's agreement according to which an individual member state could veto a 
decision otherwise taken according to qualified majority if vital national interests were at 
stake. 
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The subsequent addition of new member states since 1973 (including Great 
Britain and Denmark at the outset of the Tokyo Round and Spain and Portugal at the 
outset of the Uruguay Round) increased the divergence of interests within the EC and 
rendered even more difficult the task of reaching a common bargaining position for 
international trade negotiations. 
Negotiating mandates for international trade negotiations are elaborated 
successively by the Commission and the Council. During the Uruguay Round 
negotiations, the EC bargaining proposals were first developed by the External Affairs 
(DG I) and Agriculture (DG VI) directorates of the Commission. They were then 
examined by the "113 Committee,"2 composed of senior civil servants from the member 
states, including representatives from the ministries of agriculture and trade. Proposals, 
once approved by the committee on a consensual basis, were transmitted to the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and subsequently to the General 
Affairs Council, which then handed out a negotiating mandate to the Commission. 
Formally, the Council decides on the negotiating mandate under qualified 
majority, according to Article 113. In practice, however, the aggregation of the divergent 
interests of the member states into one single bargaining position still follows unanimity. 
Decisions are not adopted if a country, especially one of the three major countries, firmly 
opposes it. Even during the height of the crisis created by French demands for a 
renegotiation of the Uruguay Round agricultural agreement between the EC and the US 
in 1993, member states insisted that the tradition of unanimity be not broken. 
A European "Fast-Track" Procedure/or International Trade Negotiations? 
While the Council agrees on the negotiating mandate, the actual conduct of the 
negotiations is carried out by members of the Commission} In principle, as long as they 
remain within the directives set by the Council, Commission negotiators are free to 
conduct bargaining with third countries as they wish and to conclude agreements. In the 
end, the Council approves or rejects the trade agreement. Sir Leon Brittan, the 
Commissioner for External Affairs during the last year of the Uruguay Round, likes to 
compare this procedure to the American "fast track," under which Congress delegates full 
authority to negotiate international trade agreements to the Executive (within set 
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negotiating limits) and then votes the final agreement up or down without the possibility 
of amendments.4 
Yet not everyone in the Community shares this interpretation of the division of 
competences between the national and supranational authorities. While the Commission 
promotes this "fast track" version in order to gain crucial flexibility during negotiations, 
several member states wish to exert tighter control over the EC negotiators' every move. 
In the last months of the Uruguay Round, for instance, Commission negotiators had to 
report to the member states about the progress of the negotiations every two weeks and 
the final agreement was presented to the Council before the Commission could conclude 
it. The negotiating autonomy of the Commission was in effect limited. 
The practice differs once again from the letter with respect to the final adoption of 
trade agreements. While in theory the Council adopts trade agreements on a majority 
basis, unanimity is required in practice. One of the secret conclusions of the September 
1993 Council was to approve the final Uruguay Round agreement unanimously. Even 
though the Community legally speaks with one voice, the customary member states' 
consensus and limited Commission autonomy have definite consequences on the Ee's 
bargaining capabilities in international trade negotiations. 
Section 2: Divided but United: Impact of EC Institutional Structure on 
International Negotiations 
Member states have committed to tie their trade policy fate to their EC partners 
and to transfer bargaining power to the supranational Commission in the hope of deriving 
some external negotiating benefits from combined action. Yet the institutional structure 
of the EC, which often necessitates consensus to aggregate the divergent interests of the 
member states into a coherent whole, is traditionally assumed to handicap the EC in 
international negotiations.s The internal EC divisions and the political process through 
which they are mediated are visible to the Ee's negotiating opponents, which can 
sometimes use them to their advantage. This section explores the impact of the EC 
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institutional structure on its external bargaining capabilities and presents the various 
negotiating outcomes that can result from the Community being "divided but united." 
EC Institutional Structure as Bargaining Handicap 
"Let's unite. And the world will listen to us" was an ad campaign used to mobilise 
the pro-European camp in France during the 1992 referendum on the Maastricht Treaty 
on European Union.6 This slogan referred as much to foreign policy as it did to trade 
policy, recalling the traditional assumption that integration would enable the European 
Community to talk on an equal footing with the United States. The rationale is that unity 
brings strength, and therefore that European integration and Europe's external bargaining 
capabilities are positively correlated. In other words, the stronger the EC is internally, the 
stronger the EC gets externally.7 Internal division is thus considered a bargaining 
handicap. When its unity is disrupted, it becomes difficult for the Community to be 
internationally credible and manage to prevail over its negotiating opponents. When the 
Community's division is apparent to the world, it becomes easier for third countries to 
drive a wedge between member states and exploit internal EC disagreements to the 
advantage of others. 
Proponents of the view that internal unity brings external strength, found in media 
articles or in talks with Commission officials, suggest that the cumbersome EC 
institutional structure can ease the way for the negotiating opponents' gains. Their 
solutions for fixing these institutional handicaps involve further devolution of authority to 
the supranational institutions. Hugo Paemen, who was chief EC negotiator during the 
Uruguay Round, identified three "fundamental institutional flaws" of the EC in his own 
account of the negotiations.8 First, the decision-making procedures tend to produce a 
bargaining position that is the lowest common denominator of all member states' 
positions. This prevents the Community from making innovative proposals and therefore 
from having a lot to offer to its negotiating opponent in order to extract concessions of a 
similar nature. 
Second, the institutional design of the EC deprives Community negotiators of one 
crucial bargaining element: uncertainty. Because each member state reveals its position 
during Council meetings and a negotiating mandate setting the limits within which 
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Commission negotiators are allowed to proceed has to be agreed on, the Community 
cannot hide its bottom line. According to Paemen, this is a major handicap that seriously 
impairs the European Community's negotiating capability. 
Every single handbook on the psychology of negotiation says that maintaining 
uncertainty about what constitutes one's acceptable minimum is crucial to 
success. Many tactics have been devised over the centuries to maintain or even 
augment this element of uncertainty. The room for manoeuvre available to the 
negotiator is exactly equal to the difference between the perceived acceptable 
minimum and the real acceptable minimum. But because the European 
Community has to debate its negotiating stance in the Council, it might as well 
discuss its tactics in the marketplace. The twists and turns of the procedure are 
plain for all to see. As for the documents, the "parallel distribution system" is so 
efficient that all the most important papers regularly come into the possession of 
those who really have no right to see them ... Before long, the room for 
manoeuvre available to the Community negotiators dwindles to zero.9 
Finally, the Community is ill-equipped to act swiftly in the final hours of a 
negotiation, when agreements are always hammered out. Between the necessity to shuttle 
the proposals back and forth between the Commission negotiators and the member states 
and the limited size of the EC negotiating staff, it is extremely difficult for the 
Community to negotiate effectively with a deadline pending. During the Uruguay Round 
Frans Andriessen, the Commissioner responsible for external relations, warned that "[the 
Community's partners] suspect our political determination, our resources, human or 
otherwise, or our decision-making capacity will be unable to de31 at the same time with 
all the issues confronting the Community at that moment ... "lO 
When the system works properly and divergences between member states are 
smoothly blended into a single negotiating position, the EC institutional framework is 
also expected to have positive effects. An integrated policy can indeed improve the odds 
of reaching an international agreement. The EC acts as a facilitator and makes 
international agreements possible when stalemate would have probably resulted 
otherwise because it allows internal divisions to be overcome before negotiations with 
third countries are conducted. This argument suggests that internal EC divisions serve 
only to st31l international negotiations. As long as member states have not resolved their 
disagreements, the Community cannot make a negotiating offer. Only by enabling 
divisions to be overcome faster and more smoothly, for instance through majority voting, 
could the EC act as a facilitator of international agreements. 
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Impact ofa "Divided but United" EC on International Trade Negotiations 
This chapter agrees that internal EC divisions inevitably result in paralysis of the 
international negotiations, since the unitary character of EC external bargaining makes 
any negotiating move impossible as long as the member states have not reached a prior 
internal agreement. The central argument is that instead of being a pure handicap, the 
institutional structure used to coalesce the divergent interests of the member states into a 
cohesive whole has a definite impact on the content of the final agreement reached with 
the third country. Moreover, contrary to the standard assumption propagated by the 
European press and the EC Commission, this chapter argues that, under the right 
conditions, the EC can use each of its "institutional flaws" strategically in order to gain 
concessions from its negotiating opponent. As Thomas Schelling suggested in The 
Strategy of Conflict, having one's hands tied internally can be useful for extracting 
concessions externally and the "power to bind oneself," for instance through inflexible 
negotiating instructions and divisions highly visible to the opposite party, can confer 
strength in negotiations 11. 
The well-known principle that one should pick good negotiators to represent him 
and then give them complete flexibility and authority --a principle commonly 
voiced by negotiators themselves-- is by no means as self-evident as its 
proponents suggest; the power of a ne&otiator often rests on a manifest inability 
to make concessions and to meet demands. Similarly, while prudence suggests 
leaving open a way of escape when one threatens an adversary with mutually 
painful reprisal, any visible means of escape may make the threat less credible. 
The very notion that it may be a strategic advantage to relinquish certain options 
deliberately, or even to give up all control over one's future actions and make his 
responses automatic, seems to be a hard one to swallow. 12 
The EC possesses a multilevel institutional set-up, shaped by the need to reconcile 
the conflicting demands of each member state, themselves detennined by the conflicting 
demands of various domestic groups, before EC negotiators can reach international 
agreements. As Schelling's analysis suggests, the EC can use strategically its internal 
divisions over the negotiating mandate and the ratification requirement of the external 
agreement in international negotiations. I argue that when the Community is put in a 
"defensive" position where the negotiating opponent demands change in EC policy, the 
voting rules at the EC level and the amount of autonomy exercised by EC negotiators 
contribute to explaining whether the EC gains some external bargaining effectiveness 
from its internal divisions and whether the final international agreement reflects the 
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position of the median or deviant member states. This argument holds even if the 
majority of member states would prefer to depart from the status quo. 
Voting rules. If the divergent interests of the member states are not mediated and 
each country possesses the power of veto, the terms of the final agreement are dictated by 
the most reluctant country. The practice of unanimity means that the negotiating position 
adopted is the lowest common denominator. In this case, it takes only one deviant 
country to block progress in the negotiations and the consensus can only occur around 
that country's position. The threat of having one outlying country eventually overturn the 
international agreement makes the other member states prefer to settle on this country's 
position, rather than being left with no agreement at all. Once the Community has 
adopted this position as its own, the institutional impossibility to alter it, also known to 
the negotiating opponent, makes the BC a very tough bargainer since it cannot deviate 
from its offer. Therefore, the negotiating opponent has to make concessions acceptable to 
the most reticent state in order to avoid complete failure of the negotiations. In that sense, 
unanimity reinforces the bargaining strength of the BC. By contrast, if majority rule is 
implemented, the terms of the final agreement satisfy the median rather than the deviant 
countries. The EC cannot use its institutional features (or "handicaps") as bargaining 
leverage. Internal divisions are more conducive to gains for the negotiating opponent, as 
it can use a "divide and rule" strategy or reward some member states for their positions. 
Commission autonomy. The degree of autonomy granted to Commission 
negotiators also contributes to determining the process and outcomes of international 
trade negotiations. The Commission's negotiating autonomy can be limited by the 
requirement to constantly report to the member states and await further negotiating 
instructions. In this case, negotiators have very little room for manoeuvre, which 
enhances the credibility that the offer made is of a "take it or leave it" form, prompting 
the negotiating opponent to make concessions for fear of being left with no agreement at 
all. However, there are also cases where the Commission seizes more negotiating 
autonomy. Indeed, the authority of the Commission is a day-to-day struggle, where 
Commission representatives attempt the delicate balance of exercising as much autonomy 
as possible without ever asserting it so much that it provokes a backlash from the member 
states worried about their own sovereignty.13 In this case EC negotiators work within the 
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limits set by the negotiating mandate agreed to by the Council of Ministers but are left 
free to conduct the bargaining as they wish until the final agreement is submitted to the 
member states for approval. This procedure is closer to the American "fast track" used as 
a model by Commission officials. Negotiations proceed faster and are more likely to lead 
to a final agreement, but the partial removal of the internal constraint (it is less plausible 
that a member state will veto the whole agreement instead of several individual elements 
of the agreement) deprives EC negotiators of some key leverage over their opponents. 
In practice, Commission autonomy and voting rules are most often positively 
correlated. Commission negotiators have more autonomy when integration is deep and 
decisions are made according to the majority rule. When unanimity is used, the member 
state holding the extreme position tends to keep a tight leash on the Commission to 
ensure that the negotiating mandate is respected. 
EC Negotiating Capabilities in Practice 
The behavior of the EC in international trade negotiations has been characterized 
by a constant tension between the need to take into account the internal divergences 
among member states and the obligation to present a common front internationally --the 
EC is divided but united. 
In practice, the EC has successfully reached many international trade agreements 
on non-conflictual issues when its bargaining position easily converged with that of its 
negotiating opponent or when trade-offs between sectors were possible, such as the 
successive reductions of industrial tariffs since the 1960s and the agreement on services 
during the Uruguay Round. There have been a few conflictual cases in which the EC 
went on the offensive, trying to pry open the US or Japanese markets, such as with the 
reciprocity demands of the original Second Banking Directive in 1988 and the third­
country provisions of the Utilities Directive on public procurement in 1990.14 Except for 
these few often unsuccessful market-opening efforts, however, the vast majority of 
conflictual trade negotiations in which the EC participated has involved preserving the 
status quo while deciding on a unanimous basis. Agriculture has provided the bulk of EC­
US trade disputes, but other issues such as broadcasting and civil aircraft have also been 
much publicized. 
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The EC-US agricultural negotiations in the Uruguay Round provide a particularly 
good illustration of the external consequences of the EC's institutional structure in a 
"defensive" situation. These negotiations were representative of EC behavior in most 
conflictual trade negotiations, with the defensive attitude combined with the "extremism" 
of one stubborn member state. As in the EC-US agricultural negotiations in the Kennedy 
and Tokyo Rounds of GATT, the EC position reluctantly crystallized around French 
demands for preserving the status quo in agriculture. At the same time, the Uruguay 
Round agricultural negotiations provide some unusual contr.ast between the apex of 
Commission autonomy versus the subsequent reining in of the Commission negotiators 
and between the institutional confusion following the Single European Act versus the 
subsequent reinstatement of veto power. 
Of course many factors influenced the EC-US agricultural negotiations in the 
Uruguay Round, including domestic politics and interest group pressure, trade-offs 
between sectors, and side-payments. The following case-study shows, however, that the 
EC's institutional structure also influenced the Uruguay Round negotiations because it 
determined in part the bargaining position of the EC. The evolution of the autonomy 
exercised by EC negotiators and the practice of unanimity voting contributed first to the 
conclusion of the EC-US agricultural agreement and later to its exceptional renegotiation. 
Section 3: EC-US Agricultural Negotiations in the Uruguay Round 
It took the European Community and the United States six years to reach the so­
called "Blair House agreement" on agriculture because the wide gap between the 
positions of the member states at the start of the Uruguay Round had prevented the EC 
from making sufficient concessions. The decision to finally undertake a reform of the 
Common Agricultural Policy in 1992 paved the way for an agricultural agreement with 
the United States. The Blair House agreement on agriculture was really made possible, I 
argue, by the combination of a weakened unanimity rule and greater autonomy seized by 
Commission negotiators. Blair House represented a turning point for the delegation of 
negotiating authority to the supranational representatives, however. The subsequent 
limitation of the Commission's negotiating autonomy and reaffirmation of unanimity as 
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the mode of decision-making in the Community eventually resulted in a renegotiation of 
the US-EC agricultural agreement. 
Deadlocked Negotiations 
Negotiations between the EC and the US on agriculture made no notable progress 
for six years because the wide divergences about agricultural liberalisation between the 
member states paralyzed the Ee's bargaining potential and enabled only a perpetuation of 
the status quo. 
Initial negotiating demands. The initial impetus for the Uruguay Round was 
American. The US wanted to bring trade in services within the multilateral system, 
strengthen GATT rules and disciplines, and once and for all tackle agricultural 
liberalization. Agricultural trade disputes between the US and the EC intensified in the 
early 1980s, while each side retaliated with the imposition of costly protectionist 
measures. Between 1981 and 1986 US agricultural exports declined in both volume and 
value, while the EC performed well, largely because of the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP),s export subsidy program. In retaliation, the United States Department of 
Agriculture established in May 1985 the Export Enhancement Program, which distributed 
government subsidies to US exporters, while Congress provided for lower loan rates to 
US agricultural exporters. In response, the EC further increased its compensation to 
European producers. In 1986, US and EC domestic agricultural support programs were 
estimated at about $25 billion each. The central US objective in the Uruguay Round was 
to get rid of the CAP because the US-EC "subsidy war" was becoming too expensive. 
The EC first rejected the concept of a new round of multilateral trade negotiations 
when the US introduced the idea in 1982. The reopening of agricultural talks just four 
years after the conclusion of the Tokyo Round had the potential for being highly divisive 
within the Community. The ten, and then twelve EC countries had extremely divergent 
interests with respect to agriculture. Great Britain and the Netherlands, both net financial 
contributors to the CAP, hoped that the multilateral negotiations would provide an 
"external push" enabling the EC to slow the increasing costs of the CAP. Other member 
states, above all France but also to some extent Belgium, Ireland, Italy and Germany, 
wanted to keep a high degree of agricultural protection in Europe. As Europe's first and 
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the world's second agricultural exporter, France was particularly adamant about 
maintaining the current system of export subsidies and protected market access for 
agricultural products, especially given the importance of the rural vote in French 
domestic politics. IS The breakthrough enabling the EC to finally accept the launching of a 
new round of multilateral trade negotiations occurred when France, a major services 
provider, agreed in March 1985 to discuss agriculture in exchange for the inclusion in 
GATT talks of its most important concerns, such as liberalisation of investment and 
services, the issue of exchange rate fluctuations,c and the "rebalancing" of former 
privileges.16 
Given these "centrifugal forces,"17 the EC's position on agriculture was extremely 
defensive. Although several member states hoped for a major agricultural reform, the 
only common position on which the EC could initially agree was to demand a 
preservation of the status quo, thereby paralyzing the international negotiations, in the 
hope that an internal agreement would eventually be reached. Therefore, the EC entered 
the Uruguay Round with a very defensive agricultural position, whose central objectives 
were temporarily to preserve the status quo and ensure that the fundamental principles of 
the CAP would not be jeopardized. 
The US was first to officially put up its negotiating proposal before the GAIT 
group dealing with agriculture in July 1987. It called for a complete elimination of all 
subsidies in agriculture by the year 2000 --a negotiating position called the "zero option" 
by analogy to ongoing arms control negotiations. IS It also demanded a phase-out over ten 
years of the quantities exported with the aid of export subsidies and a phase-out of all 
import barriers over ten years. 19 The EC was taken aback by the extreme nature of the 
American negotiating proposal and did not submit its own proposal until late October, 
reiterating its initial plea for short-term measures, non-negotiability of the CAP, and 
reduction of all forms of support. A divided Community was ready to make some 
concessions on the issue of domestic support, but was unable to offer anything on either 
market access or export subsidies. 
Negotiating stalemates. The wide gap separating the US and EC positions and the 
inability of the EC to offer concessions going beyond its lowest common denominator led 
to a series of negotiating stalemates, which almost terminated the Uruguay Round 
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altogether. The December 1988 Montreal ministerial meeting, initially conceived as a 
mid-term review for the Uruguay Round, ended in failure because there was no room for 
compromise between two widely opposite positions. Some progress was made in early 
1989 after a new US negotiating team, headed by Secretary for Agriculture Clayton 
Yeutter, gave a lot of ground in order to quickly reach an agrement on agriculture, but a 
series of crises throughout 1990 slowed down progress in the negotiations. It seemed that 
EC negotiators "evidently assumed that, as in past GATT rounds, agriculture would be 
taken off the table before the end of the negotiations. "20 
The Commission, however, was resolved to cut back agricultural support, which 
was costing up to 60% of the total EC budget. The Agriculture Council rejected the 
Commission's agriculture proposal in September 1990 for going too far. Most ministers 
vigorously defended their farmers' interests in Brussels, especially Germany which was in 
the midst of reunification. The Council adopted a much watered-down text in November, 
which proposed a 30 percent cut in domestic support over five years, to be calculated 
from 1986, as well as a correcting mechanism to take into account currency fluctuations 
and improved conditions for export competition. 
The EC representatives' lack of negotiating autonomy prevented a successful 
conclusion of the Brussels ministerial meeting of December 1990, originally intended to 
close the Uruguay Round. After an initial crisis triggered by an American ultimatum, 
Renato Ruggiero, the Italian trade minister and president of the Council, asked the 
Commission to continue the negotiation while exercising "a degree of flexibility in 
keeping with the spirit of its mandate." "In the bustling microcosm of the Heysel, the 
news travelled fast. The Commission had been granted flexibility!"21 The US and other 
countries agreed to a compromise by Swedish Agriculture minister Mats Hel1str~m, 
which proposed a reduction of 30 percent in export subsidies, import restrictions, and 
domestic supports from 1990 levels to be implemented over five years. Ray MacSharry, 
the Agriculture Commissioner, tried to use up this flexibility, but in the end the Hellst~m 
proposal proved to be beyond the Commission's negotiating mandate. The Brussels 
meeting consequently collapsed and participants criticized the crucial lack of flexibility 
of EC negotiators. 
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Negotiations made no progress until December 1991 when Arthur Dunkel, the 
Director General of GATT, drafted a proposal providing specific terms for reductions in 
export subsidies, domestic support, and import restrictions. Most countries accepted the 
Dunkel Draft as a basis for the final agreement on agriculture, but the EC Council 
rejected the text for several reasons.22 Dunkel also introduced the principle whereby no 
amendment to his draft would be taken into consideration unless the proposing country 
had held informal negotiations beforehand with the other parties and obtained their 
support. For the European Community, this meant that a bilateral pre-agreement on 
agriculture had to be concluded with the US. 
Capping the CAP: the 1992 refonn. The US-EC agricultural negotiations were put 
on hold while the EC, facing increasing isolation internationally and rising budgetary 
pressures, undertook an internal reform of its Common Agricultural Policy. By redefining 
the negotiating mandate, quieting internal divisions and granting more flexibility to 
Commission negotiators, this reform enabled the bilateral negotiations to move forward 
and eventually result in an agreement. 
On May 21, 1992, after a year of intense debate, the EC Council of Ministers 
adopted a revolutionary reform of the CAP, which capped production, entailed a 
substantial reduction in support prices (to be compensated by aids) and set-aside land 
from production. Unlike the negotiations in GATT, however, the reform did not address 
the crucial issues of market access and export subsidies. Agriculture Commissioner Ray 
Mac Sharry played a very active role in setting the agenda for a CAP reform, designing 
the actual reform, and getting it approved by the Council. The Commission wanted a 
reform in order to avoid a budgetary crisis and diffuse internal criticism of the EC's 
wasteful and protectionist policies. The Commission also hoped to derive a more flexible 
negotiating mandate from the reform in order to successfully reach a deal with the US. 
Countries reluctant to change in the functioning of the CAP, such as France, eventually 
agreed to the reform because the combination of budget constraints, Commission agenda­
setting and outside pressures made such a reform inevitable.23 France could also use the 
strategic advantage of locking in the CAP reform now to avoid making further 
concessions to the US later. 
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European and American officials disagreed over the meaning of the CAP reform. 
European policy-makers argued that this reform represented the upper limit of changes 
that the EC could make to its agricultural policy. By contrast, the US argued that the 
reform was an internal EC matter, addressing only the issue of internal support. It was 
interpreted as the basis for a future US-EC agreement that would also include provisions 
on market access and export subsidies. Above all, the US wanted to avoid rigidity in the 
European position and therefore rejected EC attempts to "lock in" a negotiating position 
by reaching internal agreements first --that is, having its "hands tied" by a prior internal 
agreement, in Schelling's words. When EC negotiators first demanded reciprocal 
concessions as a result of the CAP reform, Carla Hills, the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR), suggested instead several ways in which the reform could be 
expanded to deal directly with the issues in the trade talks.24 
US-EC agricultural negotiations were stalled for many years because divisions 
between the member states had prevented the EC from departing from its defensive 
bargaining position. The absence of a real institutional mechanism to settle internal 
differences and the lack of autonomy granted to EC negotiators resulted in paralysis of 
the negotiating process. The CAP reform broke the long deadlock in the negotiations 
because it forced the member states to reach an internal agreement and therefore define a 
common position. The reform delimited the Commission representatives' new 
negotiating mandate. The CAP reform also enabled the bilateral negotiations to move 
forward and eventually result in an agreement because in effect the vagueness of the new 
mandate granted more autonomy to Commission negotiators. 
Internal Divisions, Commission Autonomy and Conclusion ofthe Blair House Agreement 
Negotiations between the US and the EC accelerated after the adoption of the 
CAP reform, leading to the so-called "Blair House" agreement of November 20, 1992, 
which almost brought the Uruguay Round negotiations on agriculture to a successful end. 
The combination of a weakened unanimity rule and greater autonomy seized by 
Commission negotiators made the conclusion of the agreement really possible. 
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Internal EC crisis. A series of intense bilateral negotiations on agriculture at high 
political level started in Brussels in October 1992. It failed to produce results as France 
pressured the Community to make new demands and brandished its veto threat, 
suggesting that the Commission negotiators were going beyond their mandate as defined 
by the CAP reform.25 The US responded to the failure of the negotiations by linking the 
oil seeds dispute to the ongoing discussions and menacing the EC with a full-blown trade 
war.26 Carla Hills announced a retaliatory 200 percent punitive tariff on $300 million of 
European food imports effective December 5 if the EC did not reduce its oil seeds 
production from 13 to 8 million tons. By targeting French, but also German and Italian 
products for retaliation, the US was trying to capitalize on internal divisions in the EC 
and hoped to increase the member states' pressure on France. 
Negotiations resumed in Chicago on November 2 and 3 in this tense bilateral 
context, although the American administration was particularly eager for a deal that 
would come before the presidential election. The talks did not produce any progress in 
the bilateral negotiations but resulted in a major internal crisis in the Community. Before 
concluding a deal, American negotiators wanted to ensure that the agreement negotiated 
by the Commission representatives would be supported by the Council. In a surprise 
move, Agriculture Commissioner Ray MacSharry offered proof of the Council's likely 
support in the person of Me. John Gummer, the British president of the Agriculture 
Council, who was secretly in Chicago to monitor the talks and assured US Agriculture 
Secretary Edward Madigan that the EC would back the dea1.27 This created a scandal in 
EC circles: "The Commission and the presidency were going behind the backs of their 
Community partners in order to stitch up the deal!"28 That same evening, Commission 
President Jacques Delors told MacSharry that the agreement being negotiated would be 
voted down in Brussels because it was too costly for the Community and exceeded the 
Commission's negotiating mandate. Denouncing Delors' interference and infringement on 
the negotiators' autonomy, MacSharry presented his resignation from the Commission on 
his way back to Brussels.29 
This internal EC crisis influenced the course of subsequent EC-US negotiations, 
even though Delors and MacSharry settled their differences a couple of days later (with 
MacSharry returning to his post as Agriculture Commissioner). Beyond a conflict of 
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personalities, the crisis revealed that the EC institutional system was not functioning 
properly. According to a Commission official, "the Commission does not meet anymore, 
leaving the Commissioner in charge of the negotiation to act as he wishes. In other words, 
it is a mess. We have been in free wheel for two years. "30 The crisis further revealed the 
extent of internal divisions in the EC, not only between the member states but also 
between and within the various EC institutions. As a French analyst wrote at the time, 
[In Chicago J the Americans understood that their adversaries were at 
loggerheads. As long as the American offers were too remote from their own 
proposals, divergences between the Europeans were of no consequence. ( ...) But 
on November 2 and 3, the Americans witnessed the explosion of European 
divisions. ( ... ) The Commission and its Commissioners are divided on the 
opportunity of counter-retaliatory measures. The Americans now have 
everything to gain from an immediate resumption of the negotiations ...31 
The US administration reinforced its pressures on the EC through vigorous threats 
of retaliatory sanctions, in the hope of exploiting the obvious lack of cohesiveness in the 
EC by forcing the member states favorable to its views to simply disregard the outliers 
and reach a bilateral agreement. The US attempted to obtain a favorable agreement by 
playing the "divide and rule" strategy. 
Internal EC divisions appeared even more clearly in the following Council 
meetings. On November 9 EC foreign ministers denied French demands for European 
retaliation against US trade sanctions. At the Agriculture Council of November 16 
expected to adopt a common position for the GAIT negotiations to resume that week, an 
isolated France tried to convince the other member states that the proposed agreement 
with the US was going far beyond the CAP refonn. MacSharry did not answer France's 
question about the compatibility with the refonn and proceeded with a new round of 
bilateral talks. 
The Blair House agreement. On 18 and 19 November 1992, MacSharry and 
External Affairs Commissioner Frans Andriessen met with Madigan and Hills in the Blair 
House residence in Washington. After a series of proposals and counterproposals, 
MacSharry enabled a breakthrough in the negotiations by offering a reduction of 21 % in 
the volume of subsidised exports. "Frans Andriessen was surprised: he had had no 
advanced warning of this. Moreover, he knew that it would cause serious problems for 
some member states, not least 'the one he knew best' ~~the Netherlands. After a few 
18 
seconds' hesitation, he gave his support to MacSharry's proposal. "32 The talks later broke 
down when the US team needed to consult internally and the Community delegation went 
back to Brussels, but the agreement was concluded by phone the next day. 
The Blair House compromise provided for a 20 percent reduction in internal price 
support over six years, with the years 1986-88 as reference, but with an exemption from 
these cuts for US deficiency payments and EU compensation payments. On the 
controversial issue of export competition, the compromise provided for a reduction of 
export subsidies in agriculture by 21 percent in volume (and not 24, as in the Dunkel 
Draft) and 36 percent in budget over six years, using 1986-1990 as the base period. 
Finally, European and American negotiators agreed to a "peace clause" that would 
exempt from trade actions those internal support measures and export subsidies that do 
not violate the terms of the agreement. A separate deal on oilseeds was also concluded, 
ending several years of EC-US disputes and GATT litigation and cancelling the promised 
US trade sanctions against the EC. 
The increased autonomy seized by the EC negotiators, which made the Blair 
House compromise possible, was apparent from the beginning of the talks. When 
MacSharry agreed to return to the talks as Agriculture Commissioner, newspapers 
reported that he was given a "free hand."33 As Andriessen was entering the actual 
negotiations, he told reporters that he was flexible in his position, shouting: "The message 
from Brussels? Go ahead and make a deal! "34 American negotiators were also very self­
conscious that the EC representatives had a fairly broad mandate and adequate flexibility 
to negotiate.35 "Madigan, speaking with reporters as he entered the Blair House, where 
the talks were being held, said that the EC negotiators reportedly were coming to the talks 
with "enhanced flexibility.""36 
The autonomy of EC representatives during the Blair House negotiations, which 
took place in the absence of observers from the member states, gave rise to accusations 
that the Commission had negotiated the agreement in secret. 37 And, if we are to believe 
this Commission official, when pressed by representatives of the member states to give 
some explanation, "instead we would read the newspaper, we would leave to go to the 
bathroom. ( ... ) The Commission tried to encourage secret diplomacy."38 The member 
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states even ignored the exact content of the "ghost" compromise for several days after its 
negotiation.39 The Commission argued that there was no formal text because the 
agreement was made in part by telephone and in part through exchange of notes. While 
the Commission held a meeting on November 20 to present the broad characteristics of 
the agreement, the only specific text that the member states had in hand for a week was a 
two-page, USTR press-release. Only a week later did the Commission finally send a ten­
page document to the member states, including five pages confirming the compatibility of 
the agreement with the CAP reform. 
The Blair House agreement was interpreted at the time as a relative negotiating 
success for the EC. The agreement was able to occur in spite of strong opposition from 
France, the most recalcitrant country, because the Commission representatives exercised 
a particularly high degree of autonomy during the Blair House negotiations. The 
combination of weakened unanimity and a greater Commission autonomy actually "freed 
the hands" of EC negotiators, thereby breaking the negotiation paralysis. The agreement 
reached reflected the US bargaining strength but served the interests of the majority of 
member states. The negotiating outcome would have been different, had France been able 
to control the EC decision-making process by a stricter unanimity rule and a tighter check 
kept on the Commission negotiators. 
Veto, Tied Hands and Renegotiation o/the Blair House Agreeement 
Since the vast majority of member states supported the Blair House agreement, 
why did the United States eventually agree to its renegotiation? This section argues that 
the reinstating of the veto power coupled with a tighter member states' control over the 
Commission led to a final bargaining outcome heavily influenced by France, the most 
recalcitrant country. Indeed, Blair House led to a rollback of EC supranational authority 
in international trade negotiations. 
French opposition to Blair House. The French government opposed the Blair 
House agreement as soon as it was signed, on the grounds that it was not compatible with 
the CAP reform. Italy and Spain were also skeptical at first of Blair House, but only 
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Belgium seemed ready to support France in its demand for a renegotiation of the 
accord.4o Fueled by violent domestic protests from angry fanners and by crucial national 
elections in March 1993, the French government embarked on a crusade to denounce the 
content of the agreement and contest the conditions under which it had been reached. 
Above all, French policy-makers blamed the EC negotiators who, they claimed, had 
exceeded their mandate. In private, French officials criticized the personalities of 
Andriessen and MacSharry, but they also denounced the EC institutions, which seemed to 
drift away from intergovernmentalism and allowed the overruling. of fundamental 
objections by a member state.41 The French goal thus became to reopen the agricultural 
negotiations and at the same time curb the erosion of "negotiating by consensus" and the 
growing autonomy of the EC negotiators. 
A period of stagnation during which all the major actors changed followed the 
flurry of negotiating activity that preceded Blair House. Andriessen was replaced in 
January by Rene Steichen and MacSharry by Sir Leon Brittan. Mickey Kantor succeeded 
Hills and Mike Espy replaced Madigan when the new US administration came into 
office. In Germany Ignaz Kiechle, the long-time Christian Social Union (CSU) 
Agriculture minister known as a tireless defender of farming interests, was replaced by 
Jochen Borchert, a CDU member sympathetic to the Blair House agreement.42 In France, 
after a long electoral campaign in which the protection of French farmers, the CAP 
reform and the opposition to the Blair House compromise were central issues, the 
Socialist government was overwhelmingly replaced on March 28 by a Center-Right 
government known for its loyalty to farmers. During the campaign, Jacques Chirac, the 
leader of the Gaullist party, went so far as to denounce the "foreign" EC commissioners 
who negotiated the deaL43 
The successive French governments ardently tried to reassert the veto right in the 
EC in order to reject the agreement supposedly going against France's interests. Starting 
in February, the socialist government officially threatened to invoke the Luxembourg 
Compromise against the Blair House agreement, which could provoke a major 
institutional crisis within the EC, not without resemblance to the "empty chair" crisis 
during the Kennedy Round.44 Observers noted that France could have difficulty in 
vetoing the deal because other member states may not agree that France's vital interests 
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were at stake.45 But the French threat to sabotage Blair House was plausible and the 
possibility of a veto was constantly in the minds of American negotiators, who were 
closely following the legal arguments in the EC about the constitutionality of a veto and 
the fact that the Luxembourg Compromise may no longer be applicable as a result of the 
1986 Single European Act.46 American officials took the threat of veto particularly 
seriously because the recent difficulties surrounding the Maastricht Treaty on European 
Union had created new uncertainties as to the future of European integration. 
In April Agriculture Commissioner Rene Steichen tried to seek an accord on the 
separate oilseeds deal, which required EC endorsement independently from the rest of the 
Uruguay Round, but the vote was postponed until the newly elected French government 
had clarified its position on Blair House. The French stance was finally unveiled on May 
12 in a memorandum accepting the oil seeds deal but vowing to fight the other parts of the 
agreement.47 The memorandum disagreed primarily with the length of the "peace clause" 
and the concept of reducing the volume of agricultural exports; instead, France preferred 
to limit subsidies. The memorandum was well received in Ireland, which had hardened 
considerably its anti-Blair House stance throughout the spring of 1993 because it feared 
the consequences of the deal for the Irish beef industry.48 The May 28 Agriculture 
Council bought off French objections to the oil seeds agreement by a generous increase in 
the set-aside payments for land that farmers take out of production and other concessions. 
On June 8 the EC foreign ministers endorsed the oilseeds deal with the US, which 
reduced subsidized exports by restricting the amount of land that EC farmers can sow 
with oilseeds.49 Nevertheless, the strong opposition of the French government to the Blair 
House agreement dampened the celebratory mood of the oil seeds deal ratification. 
Institutional demands: new trade policy instruments. France blamed the 
conclusion of the Blair House agreement on institutional flaws in the Ee. French 
European Affairs Minister Alain Lamassoure said that EC decision-making was not 
working properly and the Commission's methods were unsatisfactory, ending up "with a 
certain confusion of responsabilities." Citing the Blair House accord, he complained 
about the unclear definition of competences in the Community and asked governments to 
ensure that the Commission stick to its negotiating mandate and that national parliaments 
be associated with the aims of that mandate. 50 The Balladur government was seeking to 
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regain more control over the Commission's conduct of the GAIT talks. "It is necessary to 
recover a certain right to examine the way all this is going on so we don't find ourselves 
facing a fait accompIL"S} 
The French memorandum also complained about the inadequacy of the EC's 
retaliatory trade policy instruments and argued that the EC decision-making process, 
which allows a minority of states to block use of such instruments, had to be reformed. 
The memorandum suggested a new commercial defense instrument that would speed up 
anti-dumping rules and pleaded for an improvement of the efficacy of the Community's 
existing trade instruments in order to match the "impressive arsenal of American 
unilateralism." The French goal was to change the institutional rules of the game in the 
EC by, on one hand, making it easier for one outlying member state to rally its reluctant 
Community partners to its defensive position and, on the other hand, making it more 
difficult for one outlying member states to resist launching a trade offensive or retaliatory 
action against a third country. 
In June Belgium backed French demands for new trade instruments to fight unfair 
trade practices by third countries and for strengthening EC trade defense mechanisms. 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain also supported the French view, but Germany disagreed. 
External Affairs Commissioner Leon Brittan argued that the Community had all the 
instruments it needed, notably the "New Commercial Policy Instrument" introduced in 
1984 and modelled after the US Section 301 procedure. What was required was the 
political will to use them.S2 From then on, limiting Commission autonomy, reinstating the 
veto right, and providing the EC with offensive trade instruments became intertwined 
with the French demands for renegotiating the Blair House agreement. 
From divided to united: France's rally for renegotiation. The US administration 
made clear that it had no intention of reopening Blair House and treated the renegotiation 
issue as an internal EC matter. The Commission and all member states, with the 
exception of France and Ireland, also opposed the renegotiation of a deal that had been 
legitimately agreed to by the EC representatives. "Opening up Pandora's Box," in 
Commissioner Steichen's words, could also prove risky, because many American 
agricultural groups felt that the US had granted too many concessions to the EC. Finally, 
renegotiating Blair House could provoke a crisis in the EC about the legitimacy of the 
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Commission's representation, especially in the current atmosphere of mistrust of the EC 
created by the Maastricht debate. 
France spent the next five months trying to find some allies to reopen the Blair 
House deal. In June Belgium offered France some welcome support by making the 
compatibility of the Blair House agreement with the 1992 CAP reform a priority of its 
upcoming presidency.53 In July the French government formally requested a special 
"jumbo" meeting of EC foreign affairs, trade and agriculture ministers to discuss the 
reopening of Blair House. Despite the opposition of several member states, the Belgian 
government ultimately decided to organize the "jumbo Council" in order to reestablish 
Community coherence, fearing that France would have no remorse using its veto power if 
it felt isolated. 54 Belgium also hoped to improve confidence and communication between 
the Commission and the member states, in order to avoid a repeat of the crisis following 
the secrecy of the B lair House agreement negotiations. 55 
Germany played a crucial role in mediating the renegotiation crisis. The firm 
opposition of the German government to any reopening of the Blair House deal led to a 
strain in Franco-German relations, further aggravated by the currency crisis during the 
summer. In late August Chancellor Kohl surprised everyone, above all his own 
government, when he announced that Germany shared some French concerns about the 
Blair House compromise: "Europe should affirm its personality and identity in the trade 
negotiations and have the means to defend its essential interests.( ... ) That means the Blair 
House agreement in its present form is unacceptable for us (and) that Europe should have 
trade policy instruments that make it equal to the others."56 Kohl's concessions to France 
were interpreted as either a trade-off for the financial crisis of the summer or as an 
extraordinary gesture of Franco-German solidarity. 57 
In a second memorandum sent to the Commission and the member states on 
September 1, the French government stated that the summer's monetary instability had 
rendered the Blair House agreement further incompatible with the CAP reform and it 
demanded the addition of firm protection against currency fluctuations.58 France also 
presented a separate paper on trade policy, proposing that the Community adopt more 
aggressive trade tactics against unfair competition and be more efficient in the defense of 
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European trade interests.59 More controversially, the French memorandum also called for 
changes in EC internal procedures to ensure national governments' closer control over the 
Commission during multilateral negotiations and to avoid the scarcely transparent 
conditions under which previous agreements, such as Blair House, were negotiated. 60 
The French government simultaneously revived its veto threat for the first time in 
months. At the same time France and Ireland engaged in heavy lobbying of their 
Community partners before the jumbo CounciL On September 13 the Spanish 
government, concerned about its own fruit, rice, sugar and wine production, backed 
France in a memorandum arguing that several provisions of the Blair House accord had to 
be revised and calling for transparency in future negotiations. The Spanish paper said that 
the importance of the issues at hand made it crucial that the Council be kept informed at 
all times of the progress of negotiations, so as to avoid the Community presented with a 
"fait accompli. "61 Greece also sent a memorandum objecting to certain provisions of 
Blair House on September 15. The subject of the delegation of trade negotiating authority 
to the Commission came back to the forefront of institutional discussions in the EC, given 
the influence that the autonomy seized by Commission negotiators during the Blair 
House negotiations had on the final agreement with the US. 
At the same time France attempted to pursue an alternative strategy. The French 
government tried to bypass the Community and negotiate directly with the United States 
in the hope of increasing its direct impact on the final outcome of the Uruguay Round. 
"We would not call this negotiations, but we believe we should speak directly with the 
United States either bilaterally or with the EC Commission," said a senior Balladur aide 
in September.62 This strategy proved fruitless, however, as the US had no interest in 
negotiating with France directly when the EC compromise position was less extreme than 
the French. Indeed, American officials made clear to France that the EC Commission is 
the sole European negotiator; they were determined not to be sucked into a bilateral 
negotiation with France on revising Blair House.63 When an outlying member state is in a 
defensive position, the negotiating opponent is better off if decisions in the Community 
are taken according to majority and if the supranational representatives have bargaining 
authority than if the outlier retains control of the decision-making and negotiating 
processes. 
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The Jumbo Council and the reclaiming of unanimity and Commission control. 
The exceptional "jumbo Council" of September 20 eventually enabled the BC to present a 
common front in the multilateral negotiations, at the expense of Commission autonomy 
and majority decision-making. After an intense session, thirty-five ministers of trade, 
agriculture and foreign affairs agreed on the need for "clarification," "interpretation" and 
"amplification" of the Blair House agreement and reaffirmed the fundamental principles 
of the CAP. This was a compromise solution, which achieved the objective of preventing 
France's isolation while not jeopardizing the results of the Uruguay Round. 
The Commission's negotiating autonomy proved to be the dominant and most 
controversial issue during the Council. Complaining that a Franco-German proposal 
risked tying his hands in the negotiations, Brittan urged the ministers not to demand any 
new negotiating mandate.64 French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe angrily retorted that 
Brittan, a "petty official who had exceeded his brief," had no right to oppose member 
states' negotiating instructions. This internal drama further strengthened suspicions of the 
Commission's excessive power.65 Although in the end no new mandate was given to 
Brittan, only "certain general orientations" for maintaining the Be's export capabilities 
and ensuring that international commitments are compatible with the CAP reform, the 
Council decided to "monitor constantly the negotiations" on the basis of Commission 
reports during each session of the General Affairs Council. 66 This decision was the first 
step toward a return to strict intergovernmentalism in trade negotiating matters and a 
reining in of the Commission's negotiating powers. 
Another result of the Jumbo Council was the clear reinstatement of unanimity as 
the basic decision-making principle in trade negotiations. The Council decided to approve 
the Uruguay Round results by consensus. This important decision was confirmed 
informally during the November General Affairs Council, which also discussed the issue 
of Commission autonomy and decision-making in external trade negotiations. In October, 
at France's demand, the member states agreed to ask the Commission for a written report 
on the trade talks every two weeks until the December deadline.67 
Renegotiation of Blair House. The threat of a major crisis if the BC demands for 
"clarification" of Blair House were not met contributed to a reversal of the US position 
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on the renegotiation of the agreement. In November Kantor recognized that the French 
objections to Blair House had provoked an internal EC debate that somewhat hampered 
its ability to make a bigger offer.68 The US administration ultimately agreed to 
renegotiate specific elements of the agreement, rather than confront a possible breakdown 
of the talks before the crucial ultimatum provided by the expiration of the US Fast Track 
Authority on December 15, 1993. 
The Commission's negotiating autonomy was severely limited during the final 
days of the negotiations. Brittan shuttled "virtually directly from the negotiating room to 
the EU Council meeting to report --and presumably seek approval-- from EU foreign and 
trade ministers. "69 Negotiations had to be concluded ahead of the deadline, so EC foreign 
ministers could review the final text of a GATT agreement before authorizing Brittan to 
sign it on their behalf. "One French official boasted that ministers were keeping Sir Leon 
on such a tight leash that officials were 'practically following him into his bedroom. "'70 
The EC-US agricultural agreement, finally concluded on December 6, changed 
several important elements of the original Blair House accord. The "peace clause" was 
extended from six to nine years, as well as the timetable for cutting subsidized farm 
exports (the bulk of the cuts were moved to the later years of the implementation period). 
Market access for imports was fixed according to the type of product (animal feed, meat, 
dairy products, etc.), instead of the more restrictive product-by-product curbs. Direct 
assistance to farmers provided under the 1992 CAP reform was not challenged. Finally, 
and most importantly, 1991-92 was taken as the reference period instead of 1986-88. This 
would allow the EC to export an additional 8 million tons of grain compared to the 
original Blair House agreement. 
In exchange for accepting the agricultural agreement, France demanded a 
toughening of the way the EC handles unfair trading procedures and changes in the 
voting system within the EC on anti-dumping,?l To avoid a French veto still plausible 
until the last day, Germany dropped on December 15 its longstanding opposition to a 
measure giving the Commission greater power to impose anti-dumping duties on unfairly 
priced imports. The French government had succeeded in making it easier for a defensive 
member state to capture the negotiating position of the EC, while at the same time 
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enhancing the Ee's offensive capabilities by making it harder for reluctant member states 
to reject an offensive trade action. 
The EC gained more than mere "clarification" in the final agreement on 
agriculture, while the US was forced to retreat during the last weeks of the negotiations. 
As a result of the constraints created by the EC obligation to negotiate as a whole while 
retaining the principle of unanimity and tight Commission control, the most recalcitrant 
country exerted a preponderant influence on the final outcome. When the Uruguay Round 
was concluded on December 15, 1993, the veto right had been reinstated, the 
Commission's autonomy was curtailed, and Juppe was able to "voice admiration for the 
way Brittan had obtained a better deal on subsidised farm exports than the 1992 Blair 
House accord ... "72 
Conclusion: From Single to Multiple Voices Again 
The obligation for member states to combine their external negotiating efforts into 
one single Community position influences the final outcome of international trade 
agreements. This chapter has highlighted the ambiguities of the Community's bargaining 
position in international negotiations when there is no firm consensus among the 
individual member states. The central argument was that voting rules at the EC level and 
the amount of autonomy exercised by EC negotiators contribute to explaining the shape 
of the final international agreement. In particular, when the EC is in a defensive position, 
decisions are made unanimously and the Commission has limited negotiating autonomy. 
the fact that no agreement is possible if it endangers the Community's consensus forces 
the negotiating opponent into making concessions acceptable to the most reluctant 
country. Contrary to the standard assumption according to which the cumbersome EC 
decision-making procedures have a negative impact on the EC bargaining capability, this 
chapter has also shown that the EC can use its institutional constraints strategically to 
reach its negotiating objectives. Before a common position is agreed on, the Community 
cannot act, which necessarily leads to paralysis in the international negotiations, unless 
the negotiating opponent can divide the member states and negotiate separately with the 
most favorable ones. Once the member states have been forced into accepting a common 
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position, however, even if under the threat of a veto, it becomes the Community position. 
In that case, the Community becomes a harder bargainer and can secure a final 
arrangement close to its bargaining position because of its institutional inflexibility. 
From the perspective of the negotiating opponent, a Community where individual 
member states retain tight control over the negotiating process through unanimity voting 
and strict oversight of the Commission's negotiating activities is a much tougher 
adversary than a Community governed by majority rule and centralized Commission 
power. Had the EC member states not integrated their trade policy and trade negotiating 
authority, the US could have successfully negotiated bilateral agreements with the 
majority of these states, while remaining in disagreement with the outlier. It happened for 
instance in the case of the "open skies" agreements that the US was recently able to 
secure with several member states, because air traffic regulation does not fall under 
Community competence. But by joining the European Union, the member states have 
committed to a unitary external trade policy in the areas covered by the single market. 
The institutional structure of the EC, which obliges the member states to cohere their 
diverse trade interests into a single position, definitely affects the bargaining strength of 
its negotiating opponent. Whether internal EC decisions are made according to majority 
or unanimity rule produces different outcomes for the United States. 
This case-study of the Uruguay Round agricultural negotiations is very useful 
because it traces the consequences of the EC's institutional structure on its external 
bargaining capabilities. A breakthrough was able to occur after six years of deadlock in 
the EC-US negotiations thanks to an internal agreement on agriculture finally entrusting 
the Commission with a bargaining mandate. The Blair House agreement, negotiated in 
good faith between representatives of the EC and the US, was renegotiated because the 
European negotiating authority was contested. By reinstating the veto right and tightening 
member states' control over Commission negotiators, France forced a divided EC to 
accept its point of view and cornered the US into partly renegotiating the Blair House 
deal. This case-study enlightened how the eventual capture of the EC voting rules and 
Commission latitude by the most recalcitrant member state resulted in the "lowest­
common denominator" final agreement and diminished the bargaining strength of the 
Ee's negotiating opponent. 
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Recent institutional developments in the European Union suggest that the member 
states will continue to gain tighter control over trade negotiations, except in offensive 
cases where a simple majority of states can entrust the Commission with investigative or 
retaliatory powers. The Blair House agreement represented indeed a turning point in the 
delegation of negotiating authority to the supranational representatives. The informal 
"flirtation" with majority rule and increased autonomy of Commission negotiators, which 
enabled the Blair House agreement to be concluded, were rapidly followed by a 
reaffirmation of the veto right and fundamentally intergovernmentalist nature of the EC 
decision-making process. The whole renegotiation debate triggered questions about the 
legitimacy of the Commission's representation both inside and outside the Community. 
By reneging on a deal negotiated by Commission officials on behalf of the EC, France 
may have weakened the credibility of the Commission and rendered its negotiating task 
more difficult in the future. Already during the Uruguay Round some of the EC's 
negotiating partners criticized those "who seek to unravel the mandate of the Commission 
once the deal is done" and questioned the credibility of the EC Commission if it "cannot 
deliver on the outcome of a negotiation. "73 
The experience of the Uruguay Round negotiations brought subsequent 
institutional changes to trade policy making in the EC, which might also affect EC 
bargaining capabilities in the future. The issue of the division of competences between 
the Commission and the member states was raised again before the signing and 
ratification of the Final Act concluding the Uruguay Round in April 1994. Whether the 
document would be signed by the member states individually or by the Commission on 
behalf of the EC was subject of heated political and legal debate. A compromise solution 
was eventually agreed on: both the Council President and Commissioner Leon Brittan 
signed the Final Act on 15 April 1994 in Marrakesh. Representatives of each of the 
member states also signed, in the name of their respective governments. 
A major debate also arose as to EC representation and repartition of 
responsabilities in the new World Trade Organization.74 Several member states insisted 
on being granted their own competences with respect to the "new issues" such as services 
and intellectual property. In the hope of maintaining the cohesion of the Community, the 
Commission asked the European Court of Justice for an opinion on the issue of 
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competence. In November 1994 the Court ruled that although the Community had sole 
competence to conclude international agreements on trade of goods, the member states 
and the Community shared joint competence to deal with non-goods trade.75 This legal 
recognition of mixed competences in some cases departs from the founding principle that 
the Community has a single voice in international trade negotiations and from previous 
case-law on external relations. The Court's encouragement to a return to 
intergovernmental ism in the field of external trade is undoubtedly setting the stage for 
future disputes over competences and may affed the future effectiveness of the EC as an 
actor in international trade negotiations. 
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